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THE DOMINANT MODEL OF UNITED STATES
ENERGY POLICY·
JOSEPH

P.

TOMAIN**

Conventional wisdom has it that the United States has no coherent and comprehensive national energy policy.! This notion persists
despite the fact that Congress requires the President to submit to it,
biannually, a national energy plan. 2 Like all catechisms, this belief is
partially true and partially false, depending upon one's perspective.
The better statement about U.S. energy policy is that it is kaleidoscopic. If one concentrates on one portion of a kaleidoscope, shapes,
colors and images appear chaotic. So, too, does energy policy if one
examines only one segment of the policymaking process, as does an
analyst who concentrates on Congressional action, for example. 3
However, as one pulls back and looks at the full kaleidoscopic screen,
patterns emerge. The theme of this article is that, at a certain level of
generality, the United States has developed over the .last one hundred
years an identifiable pattern of energy decisionmaking and energy policy. This pattern forms what can be properly termed the "Dominant
Model of United States Energy Policy.,,4
Section One of this article presents a brief discussion of the historical development of the energy industry in the United States and national energy policy. This discussion demonstrates that over the last
100 years, the United States government has fairly consistently implemented energy policies that are guided by efficiency, that support the
market, and that seek to correct market defects. Section Two explains
in depth the dominant model that emerges from Section One. It begins by examining the unsuccessful attempts by the Carter and Reagan
• This article is a synthesis of current works. Energy Policy Advice for the New Administration.
46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63 (1989); Interest. Ideology and Imagination. 5 J. MIN. L. & POL. 115
(1989); J. TOMAIN & J. HICKEY. ENERGY LAW & POLICY (1989).
..

Professor of Law. University of Cincinnati. J.D. George Washington University Law Center;

B.A. University of Notre Dame.
1. See. e.g.• J. CHUBB. INTEREST GROUPS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: THE POLITICS OF ENERGY,
chs. I & 7 (1983); B. COMMONER. THE POLITICS OF ENERGY (1979); D. DAVIS. ENERGY POLITICS
(1974); W. ROSENBAUM. ENERGY, POLITICS. AND PUBLIC POLICY (1981); Tomain. Institutionalized
Conflicts Between Law and Policy. 22 HOUSTON L. REV. 661 (1985).
2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7375 (1982).
3. See E. USLANER. SHALE BARREL POLITICS: ENERGY AND LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP (1989).

4. I use the term "model" as an heuristic device rather than as an analytical tool with predictive
power. This model more successfully explains past and current trends than foretells the future.
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administrations to alter the dominant model. This section also describes how, despite their failures, the lessons of these two presidential
administrations are instructive, and how both served, though in different ways, as a transition to what is now, during the initial years of the
Bush administration, an energy policy equilibrium. Section Three
presents a brief discussion of current federal energy initiatives, contending that these initiatives are consistent with the model.

I.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ENERGY LAW AND
POLICY

It is a mischaracterization to apply the phrase "energy law" to
any period prior to the mid-1970s. The flurry of legislative activity
that resulted as a reaction to the Arab Oil Embargo in 1973 and the
Iranian Revolution in 1979 is generally considered to constitute the
primary body of what is now referred to as energy law. This corpus of
law, implementing governmental policy preferences, generally concerns federal regulation of the natural resources used for the production of energy and for the structure used to transmit and distribute
energy products. S
Although energy law has only emerged in recent years, it has
identifiable antecedents, and these antecedents must be recognized and
understood to fully comprehend recent events. Since the Industrial
Revolution, energy regulation has been used to control the production
and distribution of the social necessity called energy. It has paralleled-and supported-the growth and development of energy industries and markets. Indeed, perhaps the single most trenchant
observation about the history of energy regulation is to note the symbiotic relationship between private energy industries and public energy
regulation. 6

A. 1887-1900

The beginning of modern energy law started in the next to the last
decade of the nineteenth century with the Supreme Court's 1887 opinion in Munn v. Illinois.' Although Munn involved grain elevators, its
holding helped to create a major principle in energy law. The Court
recognized the existence of "natural monopolies" and ruled that states
5. State energy law, chiefly law surrounding the conservation and retail pricing of gas and electricity, also changed during this period. Still, the primary focus here is on federal regulation.
6. See generally 1. CLARK, ENERGY AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: FOSSIL FUEL POLICIES,
1900·1946 (1987); R. VIETOR, ENERGY POLICY IN AMERICA SINCE 1945: A STUDY OF BUSINESSGOVERNMENT RELATIONS (1984); ULSANER, supra note 3.
7. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
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could regulate such industries. 8 It established the principle that government would not tolerate the private exercise of market power and
that such an exercise could be restrained by the heavy hand of government price-setting. Munn, as the first in a series of opinions9 allocating ratemaking power, established the government authority for
energy decision-making and policy-making power in our political
economy. 10
At the end of the nineteenth century, energy was produced on
local or regional bases. Consequently, decisions were made and policies developed at the local and then the state levels, tracking the structure of the energy industries themselves. Also, and of notable
significance, there was no overarching energy policy coordinating the
development and use of natural resources. Instead, specific resources
like oil, coal, and natural gas were regulated independently of one
another.
Modern energy industries and markets began to take shape during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. During this period the
country found itself in two significant transitions: the transition from
wood to coal was completed, and the transition from coal to oil and
natural gas began. The second transition was also a transition from
local and state to regional and national markets, again mirroring industry development. During this period the dominant model can be
discerned in its embryonic form. The model defines energy law and
policy as that series of rules and regulations that emanate from a fundamental tension between an energy delivery system based on private
ownership and public regulation. I I Put another way, energy law and
policy are driven by market changes. As the production and distribution of energy moves from local to state to regional to national and,
finally, to international markets, industry firms change accordingly.
So does government regulation.
8. Id. at 127-29.
9. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Missouri ex rei.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276 (1923); Smyth V. Ames, 169
U.S. 466, modified, 171 U.S. 361 (1898); Jersey Cent. Power & Light CO. V. Federal Energy Reg.
Comm'n, 810 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

10. See J. TOMAIN & J. HICKEY, ENERGY LAW AND POLICY ch. 5 (I989). See also Pierce, Public
Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the Judiciary Attempt to Police the Political Institutions?, 77 GEO.

U. 2031 (1989).
II. See C. PHILLIPS, THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed.
1988). "The combination of private ownership and public control means that some conflicts are inevitable. In the first place, while regulation is essentially a legislative and legal concept, it is also an
economic one." Id. at 5. "In the second place, there often seems to be a conflict between private and
public interests." Id. Additional conflicts result from separation of powers and federalism. See also
Tomain, supra note 1, at 669, 684, 710.
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B. 1900-1920

During the first two decades of the twentieth century, modern
energy industries, energy markets, and federal energy regulations took
shape. The country experienced the end of a low energy society and
the beginning of a high energy one dependent on large-scale, capitalintensive, centralized, interstate energy production and distribution,
first in oil, then in electricity. The general intent of federal energy
regulation was to promote production and industrial stability and, occasionally, to smooth out gross social and economic distortions.
Coal reigned king during the Industrial Revolution. Production
increased until 1918, when it peaked at 678 million tons.12 Throughout this period, however, oil and natural gas markets also expanded,
signaling a transition from coal to the other fossil fuels. The oil and
natural gas markets were expanding as new end uses such as refined
petroleum products and automobiles increased demand. Because of
coal's reputation as a dirty burning fuel, the cleaner alternatives of oil
and natural gas were preferable. By 1925, oil constituted almost onefifth of the energy market. 13 But the federal government never abandoned coal during the transition from the solid to the liquid and gaseous fossil fuels. Instead of allowing the transition to occur in the
market unimpeded, it intentionally promoted the use of coal to buoy
the industry.
Structurally, the coal, oil, and natural gas industries had similarities and differences which affected government regulation. The basic
difference concerned the degree of competition within each industry
and the demand for each resource. The basic similarity was that each
industry had a transportation bottleneck. In the oil and natural gas
industries pipelines were the bottleneck, and in the coal industry railroads were the bottleneck. 14 Of the three industries, coal was and continues to be the most competitive. 15
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, oil became
12. J. CLARK, supra note 6, at 9.
13. [d. at 13.
14. Coal ownership by railroads contributes to the bottleneck problem because railroads can
either sell or consume coal for their own use depending on market conditions. Railroad companies
control the price of either transportation or coal when other fuels or other modes of transportation are
in short supply, thus affecting the amount of coal that reaches the market. The railroad bottleneck
problem exists today, as some electric utilities must rely on railroads to transport coal to their generating units. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY 123
(1978).
IS. The coal industry is divided into the bituminous and the anthracite industries. While there
were thousands of bituminous producers, (5,060 in 1905 and 9,331 in 1923), J. CLARK, supra note 6, at
4, 79% of anthracite production in 1916 was controlled by 13 producers, II of which were railroad
companies. [d. at 6.
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the paradigm of big industry. In 1911, Standard Oil and related entities controlled 64% of the market (down from 90% in 1900 due to the
federal government's successful antitrust litigation).16 Still, in 1919,
thirty-two firms controlled 60% of production, and, in 1920, the thirty
largest oil firms controlled 72% of the country's refining capacity.17
The natural gas industry was less concentrated during these early
years because natural gas was seen as a nuisance by-product of oil
exploration and was. wasted rather than exploited. Before the tum of
the century, small natural gas companies were the rule. By the end of
the first third of the century, however, natural gas was seen as a valuable commodity and the transportation network became dominated by
a few interstate pipeline companies. This development, like the market power of the oil pipelines, led to federal regulation. 18
During this formative period, energy markets moved from local
and state to regional and national levels. Federal intervention into private energy industries was episodic, allowing interindustry and interfuel competition to develop and later flourish. Whenever there
were serious blips in energy markets, primarily when production was
not flowing smoothly or when distribution was congested, the government would intervene in an attempt to smooth out the blip. In general, pre-war intervention was motivated by a sense of progressivism
colored by antitrust sentiment. The Hepburn Act l9 (which curtailed
big oil's control of interstate pipelines), the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the rise of state public
utility commissions were all aimed at curtailing market power. 20 Similarly, controls aimed at loosening the railroads' grip on coal hauling
were also instituted. 2I
The Great War only slightly shook the country out of its Golden
Age complacency. Professor John Clark argues that the war solidified
the position of private energy industries. He states, "For business, the
war in Europe opened great opportunities for profit through an expanding foreign trade. As many businessmen viewed it, America's entrance into the conflict provided no compelling reasons for a swollen
federal economic role.,,22 Although the federal government did establish the United States Fuel Administration (USFA), the first energy
16. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911).
17. J. CLARK, supra note 6, at 13.
18. See Pierce, ReconSidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345, 346 (1983).
19. 34 Stat. 584 (1906) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.c. (1982».
20. J. CLARK, supra note 6, at 49.
21. Id. at 45-46.
22. Id. at 50.
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agency with the power to regulate prices, transportation, and distribution, the USFA did not exercise these powers. The agency was administered locally, and its principal goal was to mobilize natural resources
for the war, not to coordinate energy industries. 23
The USFA relied on decentralized administration and the rhetoric of voluntarism, patriotism, and industry-government cooperation,
rather than on the heavy hand of federal intervention. As a consequence, coal production did not appreciably increase during the war,
pricing policies were a failure, rail carriers moved coal to the highest
bidders first, and coal allocation regulations were conducted on an uncoordinated regional zone basis.24 The coal industry paid a price for
exercising its grip on the nation's energy markets. At the height of
World War I, coal was being replaced by oil and natural gas. Nevertheless, the federal government continued to support the industry.
Not surprisingly, federal oil and natural gas policies followed a
pattern similar to coal regulation, also garnering federal favor. During
World War I, several restrictions on oil and natural gas were implemented, including fuel-switching, licensing, price and production controls, and rationing. However, these controls were not integrated in
an overall energy policy, and they ended with the Armistice. Clark
argues that World War I had a profound effect on future energy regulation by positioning major energy industries for years to come. The
regulatory experience from 1900-1920 firmly estabiished industry-government relations. To a degree disturbing to many, however, "the
evolving regulatory mechanisms masked a system in which implementation of fuel control rested in the hands' of individuals with a direct
and pecuniary interest in the fuel industries."2s
The USFA, symbolic of the first decades of federal energy regulation and not unlike the present Department of Energy, did not use its
full power to coordinate and establish a national energy plan. Instead,
a muted form of corporatism took hold. Coal successfully kept government out of its industry except to support it. Natural gas was too
23. For example, the largest impediment in the war effort was a coal shortage caused by a railroad
car shortage. In response, Congress passed the Lever Act, 40 Stat. 276 (1917), 41 Stat. 297 (1919),
giving the President the authority to regulate the price, production, transportation, and allocation of
coal. Such potential intervention into the private energy sector was unprecedented and was not widely
endorsed by the coal industry. In fear of the specter of widespread government control, two trade
associations, the National Coal Association and the National Retail Merchants' Association, were established and injected themselves into and coopted the administration of the USFA. "Both associations
anticipated key roles in the operation of the USFA and patriotically pledged their support to the administration. Nonetheless they defined their essential task as defending their members against unnecessary
and foolish federal intervention." J. CLARK, supra note 6, at 58.
24. [d. at 79.
25. [d. at 107.
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nascent an industry to generate much concern about federal regulation, and the oil industry, with its history of concentration, was expanding into foreign markets and was showing signs of greater
industrial concentration.
Thus, in the initial two decades of the twentieth century,26 energy
markets were structured by:
(1) seemingly inexhaustible supplies of oil, natural gas, and
coal;
(2) a shift from local to regional and interstate resource production and distribution;
(3) continuous growth in markets and in energy efficiency;
(4) increasing industrial concentration, integration, and largescale production; and,
(5) transportation bottlenecks in each industry.27
These aspects and trends generated a pattern of federal energy
regulation that persists to this day. Federal energy regulations reacted
to market conditions and mirrored the specific industries being regulated. Regulators did not treat energy industries either coordinately or
comprehensively. Instead, the coal, oil, natural gas (and electricity)
industries have been regulated separately by tracking each resource
through its fuel cycle from production and processing through distribution and marketing.
Establishing a regulatory institution parallel to the regulated industry has initial appeal. Regulation can proceed more quickly, and
more efficiently, because transaction costs are lowered. Information is
easier and less costly to obtain, digest, circulate, and act upon. The
downside of this parallel design, however, is that an industry'S
problems are reproduced in the regulatory scheme. In the oil industry, for example, conflicts between major and independent firms, producers and refiners, and producing and consuming states have been
replicated by the regulators. Thus policy development and coordina26. Even today, the fossil fuels of oil, natural gas, and coal, together with electricity, constitute
the building blocks of our energy economy. The United States consumed 76.01 quads of energy in
1987. The 76.01 quads are divided among the following resources: coal (18.00); natural gas (17.18); oil
(32.63) hydropower (3.04); nuclear power (4.92); geothermal (0.23); and, other (wood, waste, wind,
photovoltaic, and solar connected to electric utilities) (0.02). ENERGY INFORMATION AGENCY, DOE/
EIA-0384 (87), ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 1987 (1988). Production figures are similar, though somewhat lower, indicating that the country is a net importer of energy. In 1987 the country produced
64.55 quads of energy divided among the following resources: coal (20.12); natural gas (16.84); oil
(17.59); natural gas liquids (2.23); hydropower (2.61); nuclear power (4.92); geothermal (0.23); and
other (0.02). [d. at 9.
27. See J. CLARK, supra note 6, at 25-26.
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tion became difficult and at times stymied, evidencing the limits of
regulation designed to parallel the market.
C. 1920-1933

The Roaring Twenties were· important years for energy regulation. Coal reached the end of its prominence as the nation's energy
supplier, yielding this position to oil. This shift did not come without
stark socio-economic difficulties, most notably those suffered by coal
miners. Mine operators, naturally, were interested in maintaining
their market shares. However, since the coal market was shrinking,
the most logical, most simple way for the industry to maintain profitability was to reduce wages. With the industry in decline due to excess
capacity and· reduced demand, cutthroat competition, pressure for
wage reduction, and miners' strikes resulted. Coal's shrinking market
and consumers' growing preference for oil and natural gas underscored the significance of fuel substitution.
To encourage the development of oil, the common law developed
the rule of capture: oil belongs to the person who captures it. 28 The
rule of capture promotes production, but it also promotes waste, as
producers will capture as much as they can before their neighbors do.
In order to reduce such waste, the states enacted gas and oil conservation statutes. 29
At the federal level, the ~ederal Oil Conservation Board (FOCB),
a regulatory agency, was instituted to look into the perceived weak. nesses of the oil industry. The primary weaknesses were waste, declining reserve estimates, and price instability due in part to the occasional
flush field. Instead of curbing production, the FOCB responded by
promoting the oil depletion allowance and by opening up the public
domain under the Mineral Land Leasing Act of 1920. 30 Both responses favored industry. In short, FOCB pressed for government
controls in order to stop waste and stabilize prices as a form of oil
industry protectionism. FOCB also allowed large firms to control production and reduce the amount of oil on the market, which allowed
these firms to capture economic rents. Thus FOCB regulatory efforts
worked to the great benefit of the major oil companies.
b

c.

28. See H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL &
MEYERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
OIL AND GAS \3 n.1 (4th ed. 1979).
29. See generally N. ELY, THE OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION STATUTES (ann. ed. 1933). See,
e.g., Ely, The Conservation o/Oil, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1209 (1938); Pierce, Reconciling State Oil and Gas
Conservation Regulation with the Natural Gas Act: New Statutory Revelotions, 1989 B.Y.V". L. REV. 9
(1989).
30. See Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, Pub . .L. No. 99·64, 99 Stat. 156 (codified as amended
in 30 U.S.C. (1982».
•
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By the end of the decade the fossil fuel industries (oil, natural gas,
and coal) were well entrenched. Energy markets, with the exception
of coal, were expanding. In addition, interfuel competition and concentration were increasing. By 1929 the split in the oil industry between the majors and the independents was deep. Twenty-one majors
controlled 60% of oil production, ten firms controlled 60% of the refining, and fourteen firms controlled 70% of the pipelines. In the natural gas industry, eight holding companies controlled 85% of
production. Similarly, twenty-two electricity holding companies generated 61 % of the country's electricity.31 The coal industry was less
concentrated. Seventeen bituminous companies controlled only 20%
of the mines, but eight anthracite companies controlled 70% of the
mines. 32 Indeed, in the coal industry, the major problem was not concentration; it was survival. The primary conflict was not between major and independent firms; it was between labor and capital.
The 1930s brought with them a peculiar test of the nation's energy policies. Not only did the country experience a national economic depression that put a downward pressure on prices, but rich oil
fields were discovered in the oil producing states, most notably in eastern Texas. These discoveries flooded the market with remarkably
cheap oil, with prices dropping below ten cents per barrel. As a result,
the majors pushed for firm production controls to keep prices up. In
addition, global oil markets were developing, giving the east coast refiners the option to buy cheap foreign oil. Here again, the majors
sought government intervention in the form of import tariffs to protect
their markets.
On the eve of the New Deal, the nation's energy industries, markets, and regulation had developed a pattern which continues to dominate energy planning. Oil replaced coal as the dominant fuel, and
large, integrated domestic firms continued to prosper. The New Deal
did little to alter this pattern, with the notable exception of federalizing the regulatory structure. Federalization came predominantly in
the form of the regulation of interstate energy sales. 33 It was not, however, an alternative form of energy planning. Rather, it was an adaptation to the nationalization of energy markets. The objective of
promoting the hard path had not changed even though an economic
crisis threatened the country.
31. In effect, electricity was and is a fossil fuel industry insofar as fossil fuels are used predomi·
nantly in the generation of electricity.
32. J. CLARK, supra note 6, at 184-85.
33. See Natural Gas Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3173 (codified as amended in 15
U.S.c. (1982)); Federal Power Act, Pub. L. No. 97-375, 96 Stat. 1826 (codified as amended in 16
U.S.c. (1982».
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D. The New Deal- Era to World War II
The New Deal experiment introduced federal regulation into
nearly every sector of the national economy. Roosevelt's economic
philosophy was industrial revitalization through market stabilization
and business support. Although energy industries were looked upon
with some sk~pticism, their prior development ensured their survival
and growth ..
Federal oil policies during this period resulted in the Connolly
Hot Oil Act, interstate compacts, Harold Ickes's Petroleum Allocation Board and his Plan and Coordination Committee. 34 The primary
objective was to regulate production, but efforts failed as new oil production flooded the market in 1937-1938. Big oil was again the big
winner of New Deal regulation. In 1937, twenty companies controlled
70% of the proven reserves and 76% of the refining capacity.3s In
1941, the Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC) reported the findings of its investigation into the oil industry and concluded that the "major integrated oil companies markedly increased
their pre-depression control of reserves and crude production and
maintained a great supremacy in refining capacity, refining output,
pipeline ownership, and marketing."36
Coal's troubles continued during the New Deal. The bituminous
industry was plagued by productive overcapacity, underemployment
of miners, poor working conditions, and chaotic pricing. Instead of
recognizing and accepting the declining fortunes of the coal industry,
New Deal coal policies attempted to increase wages and promote job
security. The result was a labor-sensitive coal policy that did not address the real capital problems facing the industry nor the need to
reduce production to reflect market demand. The coal codes of the
National Recovery Administration, like the oil codes before them,
were administered by the industry in the fields and were not centralized in Washington. In a declining coal industry, government could
not keep mines open and increase miners' wages, even though these
were the goals of the New Deal. Nevertheless, the government attempted to pull off the impossible by trying to coordinate prices to the
satisfaction of mine operators, mine workers, and consumers. To this
end, two National Bituminous Coal Commissions were created to promulgate minimum prices and enforce codes of unfair trade practices.
. Coal improved its position slightly during the war. Production
increased and, more importantly, coal found the market that would
34. See J. CLARK, supra note 6, at 249.
35. [d.
36. [d. at 245-46.
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serve as its largest customers until the present day, electric utilities. 37
Although utility consumption of coal did not completely offset coal
losses in the railroad, commercial, and residential sectors, electric utilities maintained a market for coal. After ,the war, though, coal's recurrent ills-poor labor-management relations, deteriorating working
conditions, resistance to federal regulation, competitive producers, and
government reluctance to fix prices---continued to threaten the
industry.38
If the New Deal was not up to the challenge of coordinating energy policy in the 1930s, would World War II stimulate such a movement? Not really. The basic regulatory agencies, the Petroleum
Administration for War and the Solid Fuels Administration for War,
were divided between oil and coal and continued the old pattern of
being guided by the industries themselves. Obviously, energy' resources, particularly oil, needed to be mobilized, and, as during the
Great War, energy policies were greatly influenced by the industries
themselves. Worse, industrial concentration continued and war policies favored the larger firms as major oil companies received the bulk
of federal largess being dispensed to build $1 billion of new refineries. 39
The New Deal response40 to economic problems was to encourage and support industry by stimulating the market. Regulatory
objectives consisted of encouraging production, stimulating growth,
and providing economic stability for energy industries as a means of
supporting the economy as a whole. By limiting objectives to energy
production and industrial stability-both in the name of efficiencythere was little room for either energy planning or redistribution of
wealth from producers to consumers.

E. Post-World War II to 1973
There were four notable events in energy development between
World War II and the energy cataclysm of the .1970s. First, although
the coal industry had long lost its prominence, it found a new stable
market in the electricity industry. Second, the natural gas industry
was destabilized and, beginning in 1954, entered a period of confusion
37. Electricity utilities consume 86% of coal production. ENERGY INFORMATION AGENCY,
DOE/EIA-0384(87), ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 1987, 168 (1988).
38. J. C:LARK, supra note 6, at 349.
39, The eighteen majors "received 85% of the $805 million channeled into aviation gas production .... " Id. at 331-33, 347.
40, See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981). The New Deal model
had the following characteristics: expertise, centralization, hierarchy, scientific objectivism, and rationality. See also Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984). It
is also a model I have used. See J. TOMAIN, ENERGY LAW (1983); J. TOMAIN & J. HICKEY, ENERGY
LAW AND POLICY (1989).
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from which it has yet to emerge. Third, the oil industry went from
surplus to shortage as the government attempted to rationalize domestic produotion and foreign imports. Fourth, the entire country jumped
,headlong into the commercial nuclear market, a market that today is
stagnant.
The curious result of this period of fits and starts in these several
industries is that the country emerged relatively unharmed. Although
the energy market generally was transformed from a market of cheap
abundant resources to one of more costly energy and conservation efforts, brownouts, gas lines, and curtailments were short-lived. The
ability of the country to recover from significant market changes attests to the strength of the dominant model of energy policy.
While coal production remained relatively stable during the period at about 500 tons per year,41 production shifted from eastern coal,
which was mined from deep pits, to western coal, which was surface
mined. Although coal prices were not directly set by government,
government health and safety regulations made the coal business more
expensive. Regulations protecting miner health and safety42 and the
environment43 raised the cost of doing business. These increased costs
raised industry concerns about its ability to maintain its market share
when nuclear generated electricity was being touted as "too cheap to
meter."
The natural gas story is a, favorite of pro-market advocates because government intervention has been judged such a gross failure. 44
There is fairly straightforward language in the Natural Gas Act exempting producers from federal regulations45 while regulating interstate pipelines. The clarity of this language notwithstanding, the
reality of the industry and the Congressional intent of the Act was to
protect consumers from the market power of interstate pipelines. The
structure of the industry is such that pipelines constitute a transporta,tion bottleneck. Pipelines purchase and transport gas from producer
to distributor or end user. Consequently, without producer price regulation, any prices charged by the producer to the pipeline is fully
41. ENERGY INFORMATION AGENCY, DOE/EIA-0384(87), ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 1987,
117 (1988),
42. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1638 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26,29, and 30 u,s,c. (1982».
43. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 and 30 U.S.C. (1982».
44, See A. TUSSING & c. BARLOW, THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: EVOLUTION, STRUCTURE,
AND ECONOMICS (1984); J. KALT & F. SCHULLER, DRAWING THE LINE ON NATURAL GAS REGULATIONS (1987); M. SANDERS, THE REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS: POLICY & POLITICS, 1938-1978
(1981).
45. Natural Gas Act, IS U.S.C. § 717(b) (1982).
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passed through to consumers. Because of this automatic pass through,
consumer pressure was brought to regulate producer prices. First, the
Supreme Court ruled that producers that were affiliated with interstate
pipelines could be federally regulated. 46 Once that camel's nose was in
the tent, producer regulation was not far off. In 1954, the Court justified federal price setting for producer prices in Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Wisconsin.47
Phillips set the natural gas i~dustry into convulsions from which
it has yet to recover. The decision spurred regulatory efforts that
caused significant market distortions. The direct effect of the Phillips
ruling was to subject thousands of individual producers to trial-type
ratemaking hearings before the Federal Power Commission (FPC).
However, the FPC was unable to administer the increase in its docket.
Natural gas ratemaking was transferred from individual adjudications
to area ratemaking48 to national ratemaking49 through rulemaking. 50
Area and national ratemaking were based on the concept of vintaging
or two-tier pricing in which "old" gas prices were based on historic or
embedded costs and "new" gas prices were allowed to float to market
levels. The effect of two-tier pricing and cost-based ratemaking kept
federally regulated natural gas prices down while intrastate prices increased. A dual natural gas market was thus created.
The dual market was further aggravated by strict abandonment
rules that prevented federally regulated producers of gas dedicated to
the interstate market from switching to the more lucrative intrastate
market. 51 Depressed federal pricing naturally reduced domestic production and caused an artificial natural gas shortage. This regulatory
structure hamstrung the industry and had to be dismantled. The first
governmental response was not deregulation, however, but rather the
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA).52 The intent of the NGPA
was to unify the dual markets and to deregulate prices. Today,
although most gas is now deregulated, 53 pipelines continue to present
regulatory problems. 54
46. Interstate Natural Gas Co., Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682 (1947).
47. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
48. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
49. Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 520 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1975), reh'g denied, 525
F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
50. See Pierce, The Choice Between Adjudicating and Rulemaking for Formulating and Implementing Energy Policy, 31 HASTINGS L.I. I (1979); Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication
in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965).
51. See California v. Southland Royalty Co., 436 U.S. 519 (1978); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v.
McCombs, 442 U.S. 529 (1979).
52. Pub. L. 95-6621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified at IS U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432, 42 U.S.C. § 7255 (1982».
53. See Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (1989).
54. See infra § III B.
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. World War II marked the emergence of oil as the dominant energy resource, largely a result of oil's dominance in fueling the country's transportation sector. Shortly after the war, however, imports
exceeded exports, causing concern among domestic producers. In order to shore up the domestic industry, government was importuned to
place quotas on imports. Consistent with past practices, government
first relied on the market to limit imports. ss Not surprisingly, voluntarism did not prove an effective way to cut imports because imported
oil was cheaper than domestically produced oil. During the 1950s,
various political and rhetorical arguments were made to reduce imports for national security reasons, but the economic reality tilted in
favor of cheap oil. At the end of the 1950s, oil import quotas were
made mandatory, and they continued until the early 1970s when domestic production peaked, making them superfluous.
The 1970s also caught oil in an unfamiliar setting-price regulation. Oil prices were set as part of President Nixon's wage and price
controls. These regulations took on a life of their own after the Nixon
economic stabilization program ended. They required an elaborate
bureaucratic machine for their administration. Like natural gas price
regulation before them, oil price controls were assessed as having distorted the market rather than having stimulated it, S6 and they were
ultimately dismantled. S7
The single most notable event in the post-World War II period
was the overwhelming commitment of capital to commercial nuclear
power. The several hundred billion dollar industry began at the end of
World War II as a way to channel the destructive force of nuclear
power into more benign and beneficial uses. In 1946 the Atomic Energy Act S8 was passed for the purpose of moving nuclear power away
from the military and into civilian hands. The Act, however, still allowed the government a monopoly on controlling uranium. That monopoly existed until the Act was significantly amended in 195459 to
permit private ownership of uranium. This control was crucial for private sector· investment. Investment became. substantial in 1957 with
55. R. VIETOR. supra note 6. at 94·99.

56. See J. KALT. THE EcONOMICS AND POLITICS Of OIL PRICE REGULATION: FEDERAL POL·
ICY IN THE POST·EMBARGO ERA (1981); D. GLASNER. POLITICS. PRICES AND PETROLEUM: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENERGY (1985).
57. Exec. Order No. 12.287.3 C.F.R. 124 (1982). reprinted in 15 U.S.c. 757 note (1982).
58. Atomic Energy Act of 1946. Pub. L. No. 79·585.60 Stat. 755 (1946).
59. Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Pub. L. No. 83·703. 68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2011·2296 (1982».
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the passage of the Price-Anderson Act,60 which limited the liability of
nuclear facilities in the case of an accident.
After the passage of the Price-Anderson Act thousands of megawatts of generating capacity were ordered by private firms. The expansion of commercial nuclear energy continued throughout the 1960s
and into the early 1970s, spurred by a pro-nuclear consensus. Private
producers had a new, modern, "safe and clean" technology; consumers were pleased to receive a cheap product; and, the government was
happy to find beneficial civilian uses for this technology of the future.
Towards the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s, however, the
promises that had built the pro-nuclear consensus showed signs of failing. Instead of being safe, clean, cheap, and abundant, the nuclear
enterprise contained large social costs involving enormous environmental, health, safety, and financial risks. Today the industry is moribund. No new nuclear plants have been ordered since 1978 and all
plants ordered since 1974 have been cancelled. Although there are
approximately 125 plants in operation, nuclear power, particularly
large scale plants of 1000 megawatts and more, seems destined for no
future.
II.

PRESIDENTS CARTER AND REAGAN TEST THE DOMINANT
MODEL

The history of energy law and policy until 1973 demonstrates the
development of a dominant model of energy policy. That model is
more fully discussed at the end of this section. The decade following
1973 tested that model as world energy markets experienced cataclysmic changes. In response to those changes, President Carter attempted to centralize energy policymaking and decisionmaking but
failed. In reaction to these centralization efforts, President' Reagan attempted to dismantle the historic system of energy policymaking and
decisionmaking. He failed as well. In short, neither administration
was effective in radically altering energy regulation, which continued
to hew closely to the model policy that had developed over the previous century. The inability of the two presidential administrations to
control energy policy despite strong efforts to do so demonstrates the
tenacity of the model described here.
A. President Carter and Centralization

The Carter Administration generated a cascade of energy regula60. Atomic Energy Damages Act (Price-Anderson), Pub. L. No. 85-256,71 Stat. 576 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1982».
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tions. During his four years in office, President Carter delivered several major energy addresses, each of which resulted in significant
legislation. The creation of the DOE, together with sweeping energy
policies directed at both conventional fuels and renewable resources,
was the most significant attempt at national and comprehensive energy
planning the country has yet experienced.
There were four significant energy events during the Carter Administration. First, Carter centralized energy administration in the
cabinet level Department of Energy (DOE). The DOE was unable,
however, to design a comprehensive national energy plan because energy decisionmaking and policy making responsibilities were scattered
over several branches of the federal government, and even within the
DOE itself authority was fragmented. 61
Second, Carter's "moral equivalent of war" speech on April 18,
1977,62 outlined the substantive principles of his energy policy.
Although the principles were not explicitly clear,63 the speech did lead
to the passage of the National Energy Act in October of the following
year. 64 The Act addressed conventional fuels as it tried to move the
country away from a dependence on foreign oil, promote the use of
coal, increase energy efficiency, modernize utility ratemaking, stimulate conservation, encourage the creation of a new market in electricity, and restructure a distorted market in natural gas.
The third major event was President Carter's energy address on
April 5, 1979,65 which stressed theneed to decontrol oil prices as a
means of increasing domestic oil production. The address led to the
passage of the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax 66 designed to capture
the economic rents realized by domestic oil producers as a result of the
rise in world oil prices.
61. See J. TOMAIN, supra note 10. See also Aman, Institutionalizing the Energy Crisis: Some
Structural and Procedural Lessons, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1980); Byse, The Department of Energy
Organization Act: Structure and Procedure, 30 ADMIN. L. REV. 193 (1978).
62. President's Address to the Nation, PUB. PAPERS 656 (April 11, 1977).
63. 1. TOMAIN, supra note 10, at 672-76.
64. The National Energy Act consists of five pieces of major legislation: the National Energy
Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 29 Stat. 3206 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12, 15,26,31, and 42 U.S.c. (1982»; the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 42 U.S.C. (1982»; the
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified at 15 U.S.c. §§ 3301-3432
& 42 U.S.c. § 7255 (1982»; the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617,
92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 16,26,42, and 43 U.S.C. (1982»; and,
the Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C. (1982».
65. President's Address to the Nation, PUB. PAPERS 609 (April 5, 1979).
66. Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (codified as amended in scattered sections of7, 12, 15, 19,26,
31,42, and 43 U.S.c. (1982».
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Finally, on July 15, 1979,67 the President delivered another major
energy address, returning to his moral equivalent of war rhetoric.
Again, Congress responded, this time with the passage of the Energy
Security Act of 1980. 68 The Energy Security Act was a dramatically
conceived package of legislation that turned energy policy away from
conventional resources and toward the development and promotion of
synthetic fuels like oil and natural gas from coal, oil shale, and tar
sands. The act also attempted to stimulate a third energy transition69
from fossil fuels to renewable resources such as solar, biomass, alcohol, and geothermal steam while making conservation a larger part of
the country's energy planning.
Together, the legislation that emerged during the Carter Administration did not achieve. the intended result of coordinating national
energy policy. Nor did it stimulate the so-called third energy transition from fossil fuels to renewable resources and conservation. Superficially, these failures may be explained either by the fact that Carter
had only one term in office or by inadequate federal research and development. The actual reasons, however, run deeper. Stated simply,
Carter's energy program went contrary to the country's entrenched
model of energy policy. The attempted coordination failed because of
the model's resistance to centralization; the transition also failed because of the model's reliance on the market to signal a move into other
resources.
B. President Reagan and Deregulation

If President Carter's highly centralized, pro-government energy
policy failed, it would seem to follow that President Reagan's private
sector, supply-side, anti-government deregulation efforts surely would
67. President"s Address to the Nation, PUB, PAPERS 1235 (July IS, 1979). See also President's
Remarks at the Annual Convention of Countries, PUB. PAPERS 1241 (July 16, 1979).
68. The Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (1980), also consists of several
pieces oflegislation including: the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1980, 94 Stat. 617 (codified
in 50 U.S.C. §§ 2061-2166 (1982»; the United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 633 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.c. (1982»; the Biomass
Energy and Alcohol Fuels Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 683 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7, IS, 16, and 42 U.S.c. (1982»; the Renewable Energy Resources Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 715 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 and 42 U.S.c. (1982»;
the Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 719 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 and 42 U.S.C. (1982»; the Geothermal Energy Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 763 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U,S.c. (1982»; and the Acid Precipitation
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 770 (codified in 42 U.S.c. §§ 8901-8905, 8911-8912 (1982».
69. The first transition, from wood to coal, occurred in the middle of the nineteenth century and
the second transition from coal to oil and natural gas started at the beginning of this century and was
completed by the end of World War II. See generally ENERGY IN THE AMERICAN EcONOMY, 18501975: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF ITS HISTORY AND PROSPECTS ch. 3 (S. Schurr & B. Netschert eds.
1960).
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succeed and that the DOE would be dismantled. This scenario did not
come to pass, though there clearly has been greater federal reliance on
the market and less on centralized planning since Reagan reversed
some of Carter's energy policies. Indeed, President Reagan made his
energy intentions clear in one of his first acts in office by decontrolling
oil prices on January 28, 1981. 70 The oil price decontrol was largely
symbolic, however, because they were .scheduled to terminate on October 1st of that year.
The Reagan deregulation program did not spring from whole
cloth.71 Natural gas deregulation, like oil deregulation, was scheduled
to occur under a phased deregulation by the Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978 (NGPA).72 Similarly, although President Reagan campaigned
to dismantle the United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation, the
synfuels program failed because the market was unable to support it. 73
Synfuels producers were not able to process coal into natural gas or
reap oil from tar sands or oil shale at costs competitive with oil and
natural gas on the market. 74
In President Reagan's campaign against big government, the Department of Energy was to be abolished as part of Reagan's supplyside economic deregulation program. The DOE's continued existence
and Reagan's failure to deregulate energy in substantial ways may be
explained by the general intransigence of bureaucracies. That explanation is, however, too superficial. A more refined explanation, like
the explanation for Carter's failure to centralize national energy planning, can be found in the dominant model. The model demonstrates
that government regulation of energy is well embedded in the country's political economy. By violating that model through overreliance
on the market and underreliance on government support of conven70. Exec. Order No. 12,287, 3 C.F.R. 124, reprinted in 15 U.S.c. § 757 note (1982).
71. Coal conversion legislation, the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95·620,92 Stat. 3289 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 42 U.S.c. (1982», was largely
repealed during the Reagan Administration. However, the Administration cannot be credited with a
major deregulatory victory because coal conversion legislation dating back to President Nixon has been
judged to be ineffective. According to a DOE report, for example, between January I, 1983, and De·
cember 31, 1985, the DOE granted all requests for exemptions to the Fuel Use Act. See Natural Gas
Legislation; Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Regulation and Conservation of the Senate Comm.
on Energy and Natural Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 208 (1986); Robertson, The Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978: Fuel Replacement, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 214 (1979).
72. Pub. L. No. 95.621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301·3432 and 42 U.S.C. § 7255
(1982».
73. See also R. VIETOR, supra note 6, at chs. 3, 8, and 13.

74. See, e.g.. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED·88·53FS, SYNTHETIC FUELS:
STATUS OF THE GREAT PLAINS COAL GASIFICATION PROJECT (1987) (concluding that the project was
not financially feasible).
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tional fuels and producers, Reagan's initiatives at deregulation were
destined to fail.
C The Rough Equilibrium of Energy Policy

The energy policies of the Carter and Reagan administrations did
not last much beyond their immediate causes. President Carter's centralization policy was a continuation of the responses by Presidents
Nixon and Ford to the Arab Oil Embargo, its negative economic effects on our domestic economy, and the threat it posed to national
security. As the threat of OPEC receded and the country responded
to. market dislocations caused by the 1973 and 1979 embargoes, extraordinary government oil controls became unnecessary. Once consumers adjusted to the price of gasoline at the pump and oil producers
received accurate price signals, oil price controls lost their immediacy.
Indeed, their continuation adversely affected the economy.7S Similarly, once artificial regulatory constraints were removed from natural
gas markets, prices lowered and supplies increased, more closely reflecting market allocations. 76
President Reagan's energy prescriptions were motivated by his
belief in supply-side economics. Although oil has undergone successful price and allocation deregulation and prices for most natural gas
have been deregulated, these events resulted primarily from OPEC's
loss of power to control supplies, giving rise to the call for oil import
quotas by domestic producers. Also, the key transportation segments
of the natural gas and electricity industries continue to possess market
power, making deregulation unlikely and undesirable."
The Carter and Reagan policies were similar in that both were
inconsistent with the dominant energy policy model and with the prevailing market. The dominant model requires supporting conventional resources and recognition that some segments of the energy
industries possess market power requiring regulation. The prevailing
market is one where OPEC exercises moderate controls, where the
NGPA opened up natural gas supplies, and where demand for elec75. See J. KALT, THE EcONOMICS AND POLITICS OF OIL PRICE REGULATION: FEDERAL POLICY IN THE POST-EMBARGO ERA ch.7 (1981); see generally D. GLASNER, POLITICS, PRICES, AND PETROLEUM: THE POLITICAL EcONOMY OF ENERGY (1985).

76. See

s. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM ch.

\3 (1982); M. SANDERS, THE REGULAC. BARLOW,

TION OF NATURAL GAS: POLICY AND POLITICS, 1938-1978 ch. 7 (1981); A. TUSSING &

THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: EVOLUTION, STRUCTURE, AND EcONOMICS ch. 9 (1984).

77. See. e.g., Broadman, Deregulating Entry and Access to Pipelines in DRAWING THE LINE ON
NATURAL GAS REGULATION: THE HARVARD STUDY ON THE FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS 125 (J.
Kalt & F. Schuller eds. 1987) (natural gas pipelines have market power); P. JOSKOW & R. SCHMALNSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION (1983) (market
power exhibited in the transmission sector of the electricity industry).
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tricity is more elastic than analysts previously thought. Therefore, oil,
natural gas, and electricity supplies are more abundant than many dire
predictions in the mid-1970s anticipated. This abundance can be
traced to market forces that were stabilized by government oversight
and was no more a product of Reagan's deregulation politics than it
was a result of Carter's central planning. Rather, stable energy production, distribution, and consumption occurred as a consequence of
the interplay of government and industry within the boundaries of our
mixed-market political economy.78
The key to understanding the political economy of energy is recognizing the symbiotic relationship between government and industry,
which is manifest by four characteristics. First, in some segments of
the industry energy resources are complementary, so the regulation of
one does not necessarily adversely affect the other. Oil and electricity,
for example, divide the energy pie into two more or less equal shares.
Electricity does not occupy much of the transportation sector, and oil
is an uneconomic means of producing electricity. Therefore, federal
energy policy can support both oil and electricity production. Second,
energy resources are susceptible to inter-fuel competition. A federal
policy that promotes the use of coal to generate electricity simultaneously discourages the use of nuclear power for the same purpose, thus
promoting competition. Third, industry and government depend on
each other for the distribution and allocation of benefits and burdens.
The federal government, for example, controls most of the new oil
reserves but depends on private industry for their development. Finally, both business and government are stimulated to act by market
disequilibria. Oil price controls were responses to the embargoes, and
increased exploration for natural gas was the reaction to a loosening of
federally established prices. This interplay between government and
industry has created the dominant model herein described.
Domestic energy policy from the late nineteenth century to the
present is based on the fundamental assumption that a link exists between the level of energy production and the gross national product. 79
78. See generally C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL' ECONOMIC
SYSTEMS (1977).
79. Generally, energy analysts agree that there is a direct relationship between energy production
and GNP. A more specific consensus is that there is no "iron law" mandating a direct one·to·one ratio
between GNP and energy use. Rather, it is believed that the relationship is not static but varies with
such variables as composition of GNP, energy efficiencies, energy mix, and energy prices. More specifi·
cally, as industrialized countries shift from heavy manufacturing to more service-oriented economies
the ratio between GNP and energy use widens. See R. STOBAUGH & D. YERGIN, ENERGY FUTURE:
REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL 141-44 (1979); S. SCHURR, I.
DARMSTADTER, H. PERRY, W. RAMSAY & M. RUSSEL, ENERGY IN AMERICA'S FUTURE: THE
CHOICES BEFORE US: A STUDY 84-124 (1979); S. SCHURR & B. NETSCHERT, ENERGY IN THE AMERI-
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Consistent with this assumption is the hope that economies of scale in
energy production can still be realized. Simply, as more energy is produced, prices will remain stable or relatively low and the GNP will
grow. Implicit in this simple formula is that the general welfare increases in direct proportion to the GNP. Energy policy continues to
rely on this fundamental assumption and continues its faith in the
market.
As a consequence, domestic energy policy favors· large-scale,
high-technology, capital-intensive, integrated, and centralized producers of energy from fossil fuels. so These archetype energy firms are
favored over alternatives such as small solar or wind firms because
energy policymakers believe that the larger firms can continue to realize economies of scale. Policymakers gamble that greater energy efficiencies can be achieved by archetype firms, rather than by alternative
firms, through technological innovation, discovery of new reserves,
and discovery of new energy sources. This belief mayor may not be
true. Nevertheless, it persists, and the favoritism will continue as alternative firms carry the burden of persuading policy makers otherwise. Put another way, as long as energy productio~, consumption,
and prices remain stable, the embedded policy will continue. Thus,
the dominant energy policy has the following general goals:
(1) to assure abundant supplies;S\
(2) to maintain reasonable prices;S2
(3) to limit the market power of archetype firms;s3
CAN EcONOMY, 1850-1975: AN EcONOMIC STUDY OF ITS HISTORY AND PROSPECTS 144-90 (1960); G.
BARNEY, I THE GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
ENTERING THE 21sT CENTURY 175-76 (1980); Simon, Introduction, in THE RESOURCEFUL EARTH: A RESPONSE TO GLOBAL
2000 46-47 (J. Simon & H. Kahn eds. 1984); Singer, World Demand/or Oil, in id. at 342; Yergin, Crisis
and Adjustment: An Overview, in GLOBAL INSECURITY: A STRATEGY FOR ENERGY AND ECONOMIC
RENEWAL 7-12 (D. Yergin & M. Hillenbrand eds. 1982); Dohner, The Bedeviled American Economy,
in id. at 58-137.
80. For a discussion of the type of energy producers favored, see A. LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY
PATHS: TOWARD A DURABLE PEACE 1-31 (1977).
81. Today, a healthy availability of energy resources means that the lights go on when the switch
is flipped; the car starts when the key is turned; and, the air conditioning works. See R. STOBAUGH &
D. YERGlN, supra note 79,·at 144-48.
82. A corollary of the energy-GNP link is stability in energy prices. As long as the real price of
energy is stable, productivity is stable because a larger portion of income is not expended on energy.
With the exception of the decade approximately between 1973-1983, energy prices have been stable
since the beginning of the century. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957 (1960) (series G 244-330 & 353-426); U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1984, Table 985 (1983); STATISTICAL
ABS1.;RACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1987, Table 941 (1986); ENERGY INFORMATION AGENCY, DOEI
EIA-0384(87); ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 1987, Table 22 (1988).
83. "Market power" can be variously defined: "[T)he ability of a firm (or a group of firms, acting
jointly) to raise price above the competitive level without losing so many sales so rapidly that the price
increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded." Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94

u.s.,
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(4) to promote inter- and intrafuel competition;84
(5) to support a limited number of conventional fuels (oil, natural
gas, coal, hydropower, and nuclear power);8S and,
(6) to allow energy decisionmaking and policymaking to develop
within an active federal-state regulatory system.
This policy, developed over the last tOO years, has served the
country well by providing long periods of reliable energy and respectable degrees of economic stability. In light of this historical intransigence, we can project the policy into the future.

III.

FUTURE DIRECTION

Although the model described herein cannot claim to have great
predictive power, it does serve to explain and assess new energy initiatives. As the Carter and Reagan energy plans demonstrate, energy
policies widely inconsistent with the model will likely fail. Currently,
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has begun to initiate major reforms in the natural gas and electricity industries.
Though innovative, these reforms are consistent with the dominant
model. Their innovation and consistency is demonstrated in this
section.
As discussed, the Reagan Administration advocated a dramatic
change in federal regulation, particularly distinct from the Carter Administration. 86 The Reagan program was driven by the desire for increased private sector involvement in the economy along a wide front.
To accomplish the transition from a regulated economy to a free market economy, the program contained vigorous supply-side economic
HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981); see also Comment, Landes and Posner on Market Power: Four Responses, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1787 (1982); "Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition."
United States v. E.1. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956); It is characterized by "the
abilities of firms to inftuence the prices of their products either through independent actions or through
actions coordinated with others." W. BALDWIN, MARKET POWER, COMPETITION, AND ANTITRUST
POLICY 3 (1987).
Today, market power is threatened by natural gas pipelines and electric transmission facilities. See
Pierce, A Proposal to Deregulate the Market for Bulk Power, 72 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1986) (electricity
transmission retains market power); Pierce, Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead to
Burnertip, 9 ENERGY LJ. I, 16-18 (1988) (natural gas transmission retains market power).
84. See generally J. CLARK, supra note 6; R. VIETOR, supra note 6.
85. Most of the fuels produced and consumed domestically consist of fossil fuels like coal, natural
gas, and oil. See supra note 26.
86. In Energy Advice for the New Administration, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63 (1989), I argue
that Presidents Carter and Reagan both were mistaken in their energy policy design because both policies ran counter to a basic model of energy policy that has existed for about a century. President
Carter's energy policy was too centralized and depended too much on central planning and coordination. President Reagan's energy policy was too decentralized and ignored the important role that government plays in stabilizing energy industries, especially in unstable markets.
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incentives and broad-based deregulation proposals. As has been
stated, at least in regard to the energy markets, the Reagan Revolution
has not come to pass completely. The Department of Energy still
functions, supply-side economics has not displaced government support, and deregulation has not taken hold to the extent of eliminating
a great number of energy statutes, regulations, and agencies. 87 Still, it
would be a mistake to say that the Reagan Administration had no
effect on federal energy regulation. Reagan energy initiatives have the
potential for significantly transforming the natural gas and electricity
industries and have affected the way energy industries are analyzed.
The legacy of the Reagan years is that energy proposals are being measured against a market standard. If an unfettered free market will not
work for a particular energy industry or segment of an industry, then
the government proposes to create hybrid (contestable) markets 88 to
avoid market imperfections.
The story of energy in the 1980s was marked by more than a
touch of irony. Oil prices were decontrolled, and OPEC lost its death
grip on the global oil market with the ironic consequence that domestic oil prices fell to what many believe to be dangerously low levels. 89
Natural gas prices were largely deregulated, and although the market
was clearing as more natural gas was available and as prices began to
drop, many customers were unable to purchase lower priced gas because they were locked into long-term contracts with onerous take-orpay penalties. 90 Demand for electricity levelled off, and growth steadied at between 2% and 3% per year,91 as most electric utilities were
able to weather the storm of nuclear plant cancellations. Yet the electricity industry enters the 1990s confronting potentially large needs for
power after what some analysts see as a period of financial austerity
87. Deregulation of oil prices and natural gas prices are significant, yet the genesis for these deregulatory activities was established by the Carter Administration. Similarly, while the Reagan Administration witnessed the repeal of the Fuel Use Act, Pub. L. No. 100-42, 101 Stat. 310 (1987), and the
dismantling of the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation, neither regulatory scheme got off the ground and
their mutual demise can better be attributed to market forces.

88. See generally Bailey & Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets, I YALE
1. ON REG. III (1984); W. BAUMOL, 1. PANZAR, & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE
THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).

89. See, e.g., W. HOGAN & B. MOSSAVAR-RAHMANI, ENERGY SECURITY REVISITED (1987)
(proposing an oil tariff as high as $10 a barrel); U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, DOE/S-0057, ENERGY SECURITY: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ch. 2 (1987) (does not propose a tariff
but notes the threats to the domestic oil industry due to low oil prices); Domestic and International
Petroleum Situation and the Implications of Fees on Imported Oil: Hearings Before Senate Comm. on
Energy and Natural Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (discussing oil import fees).
90. 1. TOMAIN & 1. HICKEY, ENERGY LAW AND POLICY ch. 7 (1989).
91. L. HYMAN, AMERICA'S ELECTRIC UTILITIES: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE Table 3-1, at 22
(3d ed. 1988).
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regarding investment in new generation. 92 Adding another twist to
the tale, nuclear power's primary competitor, coal, comes with
problems of plenty. Although coal is the most abundant domestic resource for the production of electricity, threats to the environment and
to human health raise the private and social costs of its use. Finally,
though energy industries (with the exceptions of the nuclear industry93
and some domestic oil producers) have generally enjoyed increasing
economic stability, these industries are not functioning at efficient
levels. 94
The federal regulatory scheme has seen a series of "unintended
[economic] consequences" that demand government attention for the
1990s and for sound energy policies well into the twenty-first century.9!5 It may be the final irony in the energy story that energy marketsare becoming more competitive, yet government regulation is
needed to move these emerging markets into that more competitive
environment. 96 Indeed, contemporary energy initiatives, particularly
92. See P. NAVARRO, THE DIMMING OF AMERICA: THE REAL COST OF ELECTRIC UTILITY
REGULATORY FAILURE (1985) (discusses the "cost minimization" strategy of electric utility
managers).
93. J. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION 174 (1987).
94. See, e.g., J. KALT, THE ecONOMICS AND POLITICS OF OIL PRICE REGULATION: FEDERAL
POLICY IN THE POST-EMBARGO ERA (1981) (critical of federal oil price controls); D. GLASNER, POLITICS, PRICES, AND PETROLEUM: THE POLITICAL ecONOMY OF ENERGY (1985) (same); Broadman,
supra note 77 (critical of federal natural gas regulation); A. TUSSING & C. BARLOW, supra note 44
(s1:lme); P. NAVARRO, supra note 92 (critical of electricity regulation); Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory Authority, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1002 (1987) (same); Pierce, A Proposal
to Deregulate the Market for Bulk Power, 72 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1986) (same); J. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR
POWER TRANSFORMATION (1987) (critical of nuclear regulation); J. CAMPBELL, COLLAPSE OF AN
INDUSTRY: NUCLEAR POWER AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF U.S. POLICY (1988) (same). Regulatory
critics have pointed out the adverse economic consequences of direct government price and allocation
regulations. Government price and allocation controls, they argue, send wrong price signals to consumers thus resulting in over- or under-consumption of goods. In this way, government regulations
create inefficiencies by creating surpluses or shortages.
95. I borrowed the phrase "unintended consequences" of federal energy regulation from Chubb,
U.S. Energy Policy: A Problem of Delegation, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 47-99 (J. Chubb &
P. Peterson eds. 1989). Chubb argues that the unintended and adverse economic consequences of federal energy regulation can be at least partially remedied by more particularized congressional delegation of authority to agencies. While I believe that Chubb is correct in recognizing a discontinuity
between energy economics and energy policies, I do not think that the delegation doctrine has much to
offer in·the way of remedies. I suspect we are quibbling over terminology and emphasis and that we
most likely agree that the discontinuity is one between politics and markets and that the discontinuity
needs to be reconciled.
96. See C. PHILLIPS, THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (2d ed. 1988); J. BON BRIGHT,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (2d ed. 1988); A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (2 vols.) (2d ed. 1988). Indeed, the Reagan-Bush transition was
accompanied by a series of General Accounting Office reports pointing out the areas needing continued
government regulation. Regarding the Department of Energy, the Comptroller General listed several
areas requiring government oversight:
This Report on the Department of Energy describes our concerns about the following is-

HeinOnline -- 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 378 1990

1990]

THE DOMINANT MODEL OF U.S. ENERGY POLICY

379

in the natural gas and electricity industries, propose to create a new
form of market, here called "government markets," for the pricing
and distribution of these energy sources. These government markets
are consistent with the dominant model because government and industry work together to promote economic stability and reliable and
reasonably priced energy from a limited number of resources. Below,
government markets will be described and then applied to FERC electricity and natural gas initiatives.

A. "Government Markets"
William Baumol's theory of contestable markets97 is the basis of
this discussion of "government markets." He and his colleagues argue
that something in between the model of perfect competition and the
theory of natural monopoly more accurately represents how firms operate, particularly in a regulated environment. Once this hybrid is understood, policymakers can regulate accordingly to improve efficiency.
Microeconomic analysis starts with a model of perfect competition. Introductory economics texts describe perfect competition as
an economic model of a market possessing the following characteristics: each economic agent acts as if prices are given, that is, each
acts as a price-taker; the product is homogeneous; t~ere is free mobility of all resources, including free entry and exit of business
firms, and all economic agents in the market possess complete and
perfect knowledge. 98

Clearly, these characteristics represent significant constraints for any
policymaker because no such "market" exists and market imperfections abound. However, these imperfections neither deter analysis nor
prevent policy formation. Rather, the competitive market model helps
identify the imperfections, and, once identified, the imperfections become justifications for government intervention.
The model of perfect competition is counterbalanced by the thesues: (I) modernizing and managing the safe operation of the Department's nuclear weap·
ons complex, (2) reducing the nation's vulnerability to oil disruptions, (3) developing a
nuclear waste program, (4) commercializing clean coal technologies, (5) responding to
changes in the electric utility industry, (6) improving controls over the export of sensitive
nuclear data, and (7) revitalizing the uranium enrichment program.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/OCG-89-16TR, TRANSITION SERIES: ENERGY ISSUES 1

(1988). See also

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/OCG-89-20TR, ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-

TECTION AGENCY ISSUES (1988); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/OCG-89-24TR, INTERIOR ISSUES.

97. See supra note 88.
98. See C.E. FERGUSON &

See also R. LIPch. 13 (1973); E. PHELPS, POLITICAL ECONOMY ch. 10
(1985); P. SAMUELSON & W. NORDHAUS, EcONOMICS ch. 3 (12th ed. 1985); H. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN ApPROACH ch. I (1987).
J.P. GOULD, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 225 (1975).

SEY, G. SPARKS & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS
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ory of natural monopoly. A textbook definition of natural monopoly
is: "[a] firm or industry whose average cost per unit of production falls
sharply over the entire range of its output. Thus, a single firm, a monopoly, can supply the industry output more efficiently than can multiple firms. "99 A utility is a paradigmatic example of a natural
monopoly because it can lower its average unit costs over a long range
of production. Also, because a large capital investment is necessary to
play in the utility market, new entrants are discouraged, thus avoiding
economic waste. Under the theory of natural monopoly, then, a single
firm is a more efficient producer than are multiple firms.1°O The traditional government response to natural monopolies has been to secure
their monopoly status in exchange for the strong hand of government
intervention through the use of price-setting, service obligations, territorial allocations, and heavy entry and exit restrictions. 101
The theory .of contestable markets admits
. that perfect competition does not exist for certain products such as electricity and natural
gas but that government regulation need not be heavy-handed, ev~n
with industries having the attributes of a natural monopoly. Instead,
contestable markets utilize more flexible regulatory tools, thus softening intervention.
Thus a "contestable market" is an alternative, both to the model
of peffect competition and the theory of natural monopoly.102 Indeed,
such markets can be conceptualized as a hybrid of these two economic
models. The contestable market theory realizes that although perfectly competitive markets do not exist, economies of scale, as found in
natural monopolies, do not automatically preclude an industry from
improving efficiency. The basic characteristics of contestable markets
are easy entry and exit, which means that new entrants can enter the
mar~et with little or no sunk costS.103 Also, market incumbents are
99. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 98, at 911. See also R. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW ch. 12 (3d ed. 1986); S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-19 (1982).
100. The problem is that a monopolist can reduce output and raise prices simultaneously, thus
creating a "deadweight" loss of consumer surplus. By raising prices and reducing output, consumers
are denied the opportunity of purchasing goods at prices along the range that is above a competitive
level and below the monopoly price. S. BREYER, supra note 99, at 15-16, 389-92; R. POSNER, supra
note 99, at 319-20.
101. See S. BERG & J. TSCHIRHART, NATURAL MONOPOLY REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE (1988).
102. See Bailey & Baumol, supra note 88, at ll3.
103. [d. The authors go on to explain this formal definition by saying:
Thus, a market that is protected by substantial entry barriers is clearly not contestable,
because the barriers permit an eqUilibrium involving monopoly prices and monopoly profits. In the absence of barriers, those prices and profits would be undermined by entrants
seeking to take advantage of the profit opportunity they provide. Thus, the matter can be
looked at in a second and equivalent way. A market is perfectly contestable if firms can
enter it and then, if they choose, exit without losing any of their investment. If this condi-
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slow to respond to the lower prices of new entrants, thus making the
incumbents susceptible to competition. "A contestable market works
most effectively if, in response to, a profit-making opportunity, new
firms can enter quickly, earn profits at least temporarily (before incumbents can institute countermeasures) and then leave without any
loss of investment in sunk capital."l04
The concept of a "government market" consists of a, category
broader than the model of a contestable market and has the following
characteristics:
(1) Externalities. A government market is a reaction to ineffective regulations or mismatches in situations where continuing regulation is seen as desirable. Electricity distribution, for example,
will not be completely deregulated because the distribution system exhibits monopoly characteristics and because distribution of
this e~ergy resource is deemed to be in the public interest. ,
(2) Entry and Exit. Like the contestable market, the government
market has looser entry and exit restrictions. In other words, regulations facilitate players in the market. Examples of such a regulation would be a qualifying facility (QF) under PURPA lOS and
easier abandonment in the natural gas industry regarding dedicated gas.
(3) Product Definition. The government market determines
product definition. The government sets rules to determine what
good is traded in a particular market. Bulk electricity is an example of such a good, as are air pollution rights. 106
(4) Price-setting. The government market exists to serve a constrained price-setting function. The regulations exist to create a
situation in which prices are set through bargaining within a limtion is satisfied, no prices set by the incumbents that offer profits to entrants can long endure, Thus, freedom of entry and exit are the key requirements of contestability,
The second version of the formal definition of a contestable market is tantamount to a
requirement that there be no sunk costs.

[d. Formally, a market is defined to be perfectly contestable if no price in that market can be in
equilibrium when its magnitude is such as to enable an entrant to undercut it and nevertheless earn a
profit.
104. [d. at 114.
\05. See American Paper Inst. v, American Elec, Power Servo Corp., 461 U.S. 402 (1982) (an
example of a qualifying facility (QF) under PURPA),
\06, See NATIONAL REGULATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, COMPETITIVE BIDDING FOR ELECTRIC GENERATING CAPACITY: ApPLICATION AND IMPLEMENTATIVE (1988); Hahn & Hester, Where
Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA Emissions Trading-Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. \09
(1989).

s
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ited range. \07 This auction is intended to eliminate administrative
price-setting.
(5) Allocation. The government market serves an allocation
function. Through the above rules and regulations, goods are directed to certain consumers. Natural gas and electricity reliability are monitored through this allocation mechanism. \08
In a real way, the concept of a government market gives the
phrase "political economy" its full force. This hybrid market signifies
a realization that neither government nor market exist independently
of each other and that government regulation is a matter of emphasis
between economics and politics. This realization recalls Charles Lindblom's phrase that "the greatest distinction between one government
and another is in the degree to which market replaces government or
government replaces market." 109
Since the beginning of the 1980s, energy markets have moved toward equilibrium, thus reducing the need for radical Executive and
Congressional intervention. Instead, day-to-day regulation takes place
away from the more political branches and is accomplished through
administrative agencies and the court system. Contemporary federal
regulation of the natural gas and electric industries is occurring most
noticeably at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC),
the primary innovator in the developing area of government markets.
The simple theme for FERC regulation is competition. From
FERC's energy policy perspective, relative abundance and low prices
107. But see Farmers Union Cent. Exchange, Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom., Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exchange, In·c., 469 U.S. 1034 (1984).
108. Because government markets institute a new hybrid regulatory/market regime, there is the
possibility of a mismatch between the newly created market and the industry problem it is intended to
fix. Consequently, there are effects that need to be watched, three of which are:
(I) Transition Costs. Legal transitions are costly, and these costs must be monitored. The creation of a government market in natural gas and electricity, for example, may well raise the cost of
these services to certain captive customers without government oversight.
(2) Antitrust. As government regulation lessens, there will be a need for an increase in antitrust
oversight. Because the government is now creating markets, these markets will run into the very
sticky area of antitrust exemptions. Should a player in a government market receive any special
antitrust immunity? This will be a central question to this whole enterprise. In addition, antitrust
enforcement will generally have to be watched to ensure that either these government created
markets or actors outside the markets do not exercise market power.
(3) Long-term Contracts. There will be many players who will seek to contract around the government market or even contract benefits out of that market. Transaction cost economics provide a
model of what happens when there is contracting to avoid government regulations. In energy law,
the problem of take-or-pay contracts as well as long-term contracts with captive shippers of coal
are two examples of contracting around government regulations. Those contracts have adverse
consequences for some consumers of those product5 and those third parties may require government protection.
109. C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ix
(1977).

HeinOnline -- 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 382 1990

1990]

THE DOMINANT MODEL OF U.S. ENERGY POLICY

383

indicate increasing competition in the natural gas and electricity industries .. FERC is trying to move the pricing and allocation decisions
of both industries toward market-based mechanisms and away from
administrative law judges. FERC initiatives in the two industries are
examples of the emergence of government regulation freeing markets
for the pricing and allocation of goods.

B. FERC Natural Gas Initiatives
Recent FERC natural gas regulation has been considered nothing
short of revolutionary. 110 Through a series of rulemaking orders as
interpreted by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and provoked by the
market dislocation in. the mid-1970s caused by dual natural gas markets, III the natural gas industry is facing its most significant restructuring since the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA).112
Shortages and rising prices in the mid-1970s resulted in significant regulatory activity by Congress and structural changes in the natural gas industry. First, Congress passed the NGPA, which was
designed to stimulate production, unify the market, and cushion consumers from gross price shocks. l13 The second event was private ordering through contract. 114 In addition, pipeline companies entered
into long-term contracts with producers under which the pipelines
were obligated to take-or-pay for up to 95% of the contract amount of
natural gas. I IS Unfortunately, when an abundance of gas developed,
as in the 1980s, high take-or-pay obligations prevented lower priced
natural gas from getting to the market. The market was thus
distorted. 116
In response to this distortion, pipelines, producers, and consum110. Fox, Transforming an Industry by Agency Rulemaking: Regulation of Natural Gas by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 113-14 (1988). See also Pierce,
Reconstituting the Naturai Gas Industry from Wellhead to Burnertip, 9 ENERGY L.J. 22 (1988).
111. See S. BREYER & P. MACAvoy, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION (1974); Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural Gas
Producers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 941 (1973); A. TUSSING & C. BARLOW, supra note 76; S. BREYER, supra
note 99.
112. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351 (codified at 15 U.S.c. §§ 3301-3432 (1982». See also
Allison, Natural Gas Pricing: The Eternal Debate, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1985).
113. Allison, supra note 112.
114. See Pierce, Natural Gas Regulation. Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63 (1982).
115. See. e.g., Medina, McKenzie & Daniel, Take or Litigate: Enforcing the Plain Meaning of the
Take-or-Pay Clause in Natural Gas Contracts, 40 ARK. L. REV. 185 (1986).
116. From 1978 through 1987, the NGPA has had extremely unfavorable effects on all segments of the industry. Consumer prices have been well above the level that would exist in a
competitive market. At the same time, the existence of a large surplus of gas throughout the
period has forced the shut in of many gas supplies and has driven a large number of gas
prod~cers into bankruptcy. Simultaneously, interstate pipelines have incurred contractualliabilities of $11.7 .billion for gas they are obligated to pay for but unwilling to take because the
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ers petitioned FERC for relief. Pipelines tried to insure their cash flow
to pay their fixed and variable costs through minimum billings. 117
Pipelines also tried to get access to the surplus market through special
marketing' programs. I IS Producers simply wanted to get their gas to
market, and they supported the special marketing programs. Consumers, naturally, tried to avoid the imposition of "minimum bills" in
which gas was more costly than its market value. Also, some consumers protested the new marketing programs that excluded them from
participation. I 19
FERC reacted to these requests and to changing market conditions by attempting to loosen pricing and entry and exit controls for
the purpose of letting gas flow more smoothly through the distribution
system from producer to end-user or, in industry jargon, from wellhead to burnertip. Because pipelines were the bottleneck in the natural gas fuel cycle, they were the targets of FERC regulatory eiforts. 120
In Order No. 436,121 FERC proposed to separate the merchant
and transportation roles of pipeline companies as a means of opening
access for captive customers and others who found it difficult to switch
fuels or supplies. 122 Order No. 436 was ultimately remanded to FERC
market will not permit them to sell gas in the volumes and at the prices to which they are
committed by contract.
Pierce, Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead to Burnertip, supra note 83, at 11 (foot·
notes omitted).
117. Elimination of Variable Costs from Certain Natural Gas Pipeline Minimum Commodity Bill
Provisions, Order No. 380, Midwestern Gas Transmission Co., 26 F.E.R.C. (CCH) ~ 61,318 (1984). See
also, Order No. 380·A, 28 F.E.R.C. ~ 61,175 (1984); Order No. 380·C, 29 F.E.R.C. (CCH) ~ 61,077
(1984); and Order No. 380·D, 29 F.E.R.C. (CCH) ~ 61,332 (1984); Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 770
F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1114 (1986). Fixed cost provisions of minimum
billings were addressed in individual proceedings. See, e.g., Transwestern Pipeline Co. v FERC, 820
F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988).
118. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 25 F.E.R.C. (CCH) ~ 61,220 (1983). While utilities (also
referred to as local distribution companies or LDCs) can pass through the higher cost natural gas to
their customers, the high prices will reduce demand thus reducing LDCs' profits. Therefore, neither
LDCs nor their customers were happy with the SMP. See Maryland People's Counsel v. FERC, 761
F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1985); 761 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1985); and, 768 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
119. There was a double sting to the exclusion from the new marketing programs. Not only were
consumers not able to buy the cheaper gas, they had to pay a higher portion of fixed costs not absorbed
by the beneficiaries of the new programs.
120. See Pierce, ReconSidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas Indus·
try, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1983) (questioning the need for pipeline regulation in today's market);·
Note, Is Natural Gas Pipeline Regulation Worth the Fuss?, 40 STAN. L. REV. 753 (1988) (same).
121. See Order No. 436, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol,
50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985), modified, Order No. 436·A, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,217 (1985), modified, Order
No. 436·B, 51 Fed. Reg. 6,398 (1986), vacated, Associated Gas Distrib. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C.
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1469 (1988).
.
122. According to Professor William Fox, Order No. 436 had four objectives:
(I) non·discriminatory transportation for all shippers if a pipeline volunteers to .open
access;
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by the D.C. Circuit in Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC 123 for
FERC's failure to relieve pipelines from their take-or-pay burdens.
Even though it did result in a remand, the opinion largely approved of
FERC's .regulatory efforts. The court upheld FERC's jurisdiction to
promulgate open access provisions as long as the provisions were nondiscriminatory. As a result, Associated Gas Distributors is a landmark
decision for natural gas regulation. The court also sustained the order's flexible rate treatment. This approach to ratemaking allowed
pipelines to set rates within a zone of reasonableness and to give discounts rather than have the pipelines tied to a single cost-based rate. 124
More innovatively, the court upheld regulations that allowed pipeline
customers to modify their contracts ·with pipelines unilaterally under
certain circumstances by converting a percentage of their contract demand from a gas· purchase obligation to an "unbundled" transportation obligation.
After being thrice rebuffed by the court 125 for not adequately handling the take-or-pay issue, FERC was forced to respond. It did so
(2) relaxed ratemaking treatment of pipelines' take-or-pay buyout agreements;
(3) expedited and easier treatment for some new construction and abandonments; and,
(4) price protection for some customers of pipelines who enjoyed the advantages of "old"
gas.
Fox, supra note 110, at 125.
Professor Pierce characterizes the "voluntariness" of the transportation provisions of Order No.
436 as follows:
.
The effect of Order No. 436 on any pipeline that becomes an equal access carrier is to
force the pipeline to compete with others-producers, other pipelines and gas marketing
companies-in the sales market. As a result, the pipeline no longer has monopoly power in
the sales market, the monopoly rationale for regulating pipeline sales is eliminated, and the
pipeline no longer can use regulation of the sales market as a means of protecting itself from
competition.
Pierce, Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from WeI/head to Burnertip, supra note 83, at 25 (footnotes omitted). See also Griggs, Restructuring the Natural Gas Industry: Order N~. 436 and Other
Regulatory Initiatives, 7 ENERGY L.J. 71 (1986).
123. See Associated Gas Distrib. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom,
Southern California Gas Co. v. FERC, 108 S.Ct. 1469 (1988).
124. FERC is experimenting with a form of "Ramsey" rates. Professor Pierce explains:
The FERC undertakes this task in Order No. 436 by adopting Ramsey pricing principles
for pipeline transportation. A pipeline can charge any rate between a ceiling based on its
fully allocated cost of transportation arid a floor based on its variable cost. The difference
between the two is, in aggregate, the pipeline's fixed costs, and the amount by which the
rate charged a customer exceeds the floor is that customer's contribution to the pipeline's
fixed costs.
Pierce, Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from WeI/head to Burnertip, supra note 83, at 25 (footnotes omitted).
125. The D.C. Circuit told the FERC to look more closely at the take-or-pay issue in Maryland
People's Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Associated Gas Distrib. v. FERC,824 F.2d
981 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S.Ct. 1469 (1988); and in Consolidated Edison Co. of New York
v. FERC, 823 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (1985 FERC abandonment policy remanded because it
contained the same "pervasive defect" of avoiding the take-or-pay issue found in Order No. 380 and
Order No 436).
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with Order No. 500. 126 According to FERC Chair Martha Hesse, the
underlying philosophy of Order No. 500 is "spreading the pain," to
the end of making open access "a fact of life in the gas industry."127
Order Nos. 436 and 500 form the heart of the regulatory revolution in the natural gas industry by their attempts to pry open access to
markets through pipelines and by trying to resolve the multi-billion
dollar take-or-pay liability problem. Although these efforts recently
have been dealt a setback by the Fifth Circuit,128 FERC has been moving toward the objective of promoting a more competitive natural gas
market by focusing on pipelines. By easing entry and exit controls and
expanding price decontrols, these natural gas regulations constitute a
government market. 129

C FERC Electricity Initiatives
From the end of World War II until the late 1960s, the electricity
market remained stable. Then from the late 1960s until the early
1980s, the market experienced drastic swings, eventually leveling off to
a steady growth averaging between 2% and 3% per year. 130 The consensus interpretation of these market changes is that excess capacity,
slowed growth in demand, greater price elasticity of demand, new en126. See Regulation of Natural Gas After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, Order No. 500, 52 Fed.
Reg. 30,334 (1987), modified, Order No. 500-A, 52 Fed. Reg. 39,507 (1987), modified, Order No. 500B, 52 Fed. Reg. 39,630 (1987), modified, Order No. 500-C, 52 Fed. Reg. 48,986 (1987), modified, Order
No. 500-D, 53 Fed. Reg. 8,439 (1988). Natural gas lawyers Hollis and leDuc point out that the 500
series of FERC orders is intended to remedy the defects.of Order No. 436 as found by the D.C. Circuit
in Associated Gas Distributors by:

(I) Providing that an open access pipeline may refuse transportation of producer owned
gas unless the producer offers the pipeline a take-or-pay credit;
(2) adopting two alternative mechanisms for pipeline recovery of past buy-down or buy-out
of take-or-pay liabilities;
(3) establishing principles for earlier recovery of future gas supply charges; and,
(4) eliminating the contract demand reduction.
Hollis & LeDuc, Order No. 500 et al.: The FERC's Long and Winding Road to Take-or-Pay Resolution,
2 NAT. GAS L.J. I, II (1988).
127. See Romo, A Natural Gas Policy Update-Spreading the Pain: Part II, 121 PUB. UTIL.
FORT., May 26, 1988, at 40-41.
.
128. Mobil Oil Exploration & Prod. Southeast, Inc. v. FERC, 885 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1989)
(FERC Order No. 451 vacated' on ratemaking, pre-granted abandonment, take-or-pay, and open
access).
129. In the Order No. 451 series, FERC extended price deregulation and eliminated "vintaging."
See 52 Fed. Reg. 22,168 (1986); FERC Order No. 490-A, 53 Fed. Reg. 29,002 (1988) (18 C.F.R. PI.
157). In Order No. 490, 53 Fed. Reg. 4,121 (1988) and Order No. 490-A, 53 Fed. Reg. 29,002 (1988)
(18 C.F.R. Pt. 157) FERC loosened its abandonment policies. With Order No. 497, 53 Fed. Reg.
22,139 (J988) (18 C.F.R. Pts. 161,250,284) FERC attempted to curb anti-competitive gas marketing
practices.
130. Yokell & Violette, Market Structure and Opportunities in the Electric Utility Industry Today,
121 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 7, 1988, at 9.
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trants in the generation end of the fuel cycle,131 and merger, acquisition, and spin-off activities all evince a competitive climate the
electricity industry has not seen since the tum of the century. \32
Yet, as in the natural gas market, there is a paradox accompanying increased competition. Although there are more options available
for the generation of electricity on the supply side and more options
for consumers to choose from on the demand side, these options are
not available to all consumers. Specifically, purchasing flexibility exists for large industrial consumers but does not filter down to smaller
customers. 133
In a controversiaP34 series of proposed rulemakings, FERC is
gravitating toward greater reliance on market-like competition to align
more closely supply, demand, and price, rather than have prices artificially set by federal or state regulators. FERC's free market favoritism is theoretically sound. However, there are structural impediments
in the electricity industry-just as there are in the natural gas industry-that make complete transition from regulation to market undesirable. Like the natural gas industry, the electricity industry may be
able to promote more competition in the generation segment of its fuel
cycle, but the transmission segment exhibits monopoly characteristics,
and, hence, this segment must be regulated. Regulation of transmission is necessary to prevent captive customers, small commercial and
residential users, from being forced to absorb excess utility costs.
FERC's rulemaking activities aspire to achieve two goals. First,
FERC wants to discontinue setting wholesale rates administratively
and to have them set in something like a competitive market. 13S Sec131. See generally Lennon & Meyers, Net Energy Use Impacts of PURPA Implementation, 122
PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 12, 1988, at 28.
132. See O'Connor, Levin, Cahill & Keenan, The Transition 10 Competition in the Electric Utility
Industry, 8 ENERGY L. & PoL'y, 223 (1988); Kirsten, Deregulation and Reorganization in the Electric
Utility Industry, 120 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 3, 1987, at II; Scherer, Powering America to a More
Productive Future, 121 PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 9, 1988, at 17; The Electric Utility Executives' Forum,
121 PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 9, 1988, at 78; Studness, Electric Utility Capacity Planning and U.S. Energy Policy, 122 PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 7, 1988, at 33.
133. Yet those smaller, captive, residential and commercial customers will bear increased
costs and reliability burdens created by those who are granted such purchasing flexibility .

•••
By ensuring service to captive customers who are unable to leave the system ... utilities
will incur higher costs. These costs will make them less likely to compete with their unregulated counterparts for the more profitable segments of the market. This in tum will make it
increasingly difficult to serve their customers economically.
Scherer, supra note 132, at 19.
134. See generally Romo, 1988: The Year the FERC Shook Electricity, 122 PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Sept. I, 1988, at 29.
.
135. See, e.g., Barker, A Workable Test of a Workably Competitive Bulk Power Market, 122 PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Apr. 14, 1988, at 13, 14, which sets out a test for creating such a market:
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and, following the successful lead of PURPA, which opened up markets in co-generation and small power production,136 FERC proposes
to even further expand generation options to encourage competition.
PURPA began developing generation alternatives by creating a
new electricity market. Under PURPA, a co-generation facility 137 or
small power producer 138 can become a "qualifying facility" (QF) entitled to sell their excess product to a utility 139 up to the utility's avoided
cost. 14O Therefore, any QF that can produce more electricity than it
can use at a cost lower than the cost of electricity of the purchasing
utility can make a profit by law on those sales.
The PURPA scheme successfully brought new entrants into the
market and increased the energy efficiency of electricity production. 141
Building on that success, FERC has issued three notices of proposed
. rulemaking (NOPRs) that have the potential to revolutionize federal
regulation of electricity to the same degree that FERC's natural gas
revolution did. 142
Two NOPRs concern avoided cost determinations. In Docket
No. 88_5,143 FERC proposes the establishment of bidding procedures
to be implemented by state regulatory authorities and nonregulated
electric utilities as a means of establishing rates for QF power
purchases. This proposed rule would create an artificial market for
price setting and would avoid a fixed reliance on a utility's full avoided
cost. If successful, such bidding would encourage cogeneration and
It is proposed that for a selling utility to qualify as a being approved to charge marketbased rates for bulk power interchange and transmission service, there must be at least two
other potential sellers of comparable services to the buying utility. Therefore, each buyer
should have, at a minimum, three viable suppliers for a service in order to establish a workably competitive interchange market.
136. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(1982) (P\JRPA § 210).
137. 18 C.F.R. § 292.205 (1989).
138. 18 C.F.R. § 292.204 (1989).
139. 18 C.F.R. § 292 subpart C (1989).
140. 18 C.F.R. § 292.IOI(b)(6)(1989). American Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Elec. Power Servo
Corp., 461 U.S. 402 (1983).
141. See Lennon & Meyers, Net Energy Use Impacts of PURPA Implementation, 121 PUB. UTIL.
FORT., May 12, 1988, at 28 (authors also find that QF electricity has reduced reliance on oil and
natural gas generated electricity). The "threat" of QF power, or the "threat" of the full avoided cost
obligation imposed on utilities has instigated some utilities to offer "discount" rates to industrial consumers. The discount is that the utility will lower the industrial consumer's rate if the consumer agrees
not to build a cogeneration facility. See Norris, 1987-The Year in Review, 121 PUB. UT1L. FORT., Jan.
7, 1988, at 42; Bain, State Regulation of "Anti-cogeneration" Contracts, 121 PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 23,
1988, at 43.
142. See 53 Fed. Reg. 9324-34 (1988) (18 C.F.R. Pts. 35 and 293) for a brief description of the
NOPRs.
143. See Regulations Governing Bidding Programs, FERC Okt. No. RM88-5-000 (Mar. 16,
1988) in FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N REP. (CCH) ~ 32,455, 32,021 (proposed rules to be codified in
18 C.F.R. Pts. 35 & 293).
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small power production, energy conservation, efficient use of facilities,
and equitable rates. l44 In the second rulemaking, FERC Docket No.
88-6, guidelines are provided for states that choose to set rates administratively rather than through an auction-like market. 145
In its third NOPR, Docket No. RM88_4,146 FERC proposes the
creation of a new entity in the electricity market, independent power
producers (IPPS).147 Like QFs, IPPs compete with traditional public
utilities, and among themselves, for a share of an emerging market.
Traditional public utilities may have reached their technological capacity,148 as evidenced by the fact that they are producing electricity
at a cost higher than other producers. Through IPPs, FERC intends
to exploit this gap. 149
The IPP notice proposes that rates will be set according to a bidding process similar to that for QF power. In other words, IPP
ratemaking will be determined in a constrained market rather than on
a historic cost basis. 150 This rate regulation is an attempt to reform
traditional ratemaking by setting rates more competitively. It is also
an attempt to rationalize electricity pricing by treating the new class of
suppliers uniformly.
IPPs and QFs fit the economic theory behind contestable markets
and government markets. As new entrants, they must offer electricity
144. [d. at 2.
145. Administrative Determination of Full Avoided Costs, Sales of Power to Qualifying Facilities, and Interconnection Facilities, FERC Dkt. No. RM88-6-OOO (Mar. 16, 1988) (amending 18 C.F.R.
§§ 292.304-.306 (1987».
146. Regulations Governing Independent Power Producers, FERC Dkt. No. RM 88-4-000 (Mar.
16, 1988) (to be codified in 18 C.F.R. Pts. 38 and 382).
147. An IPP is defined as a power producer that does not have a franchise area and does not own
transmission facilities, or in other words is not structured like a classic public utility. [d. at 34. The
FERC definition also requires that all sales be made from an independent power facility (IPF). The
IPF is not in any utility's rate base and is not otherwise afforded cost-of-service treatment so that the
IPP does not get a competitive edge by having all or a portion of its costs protected by traditional
regulation.
148. [d. at 54.
149. There are three forms that an IPP can take. First, an IPP can include industrial IPPs that
generate more power than they need for their own consumption, then sell the excess. A second form
would be a non-utility, non-industrial entity that has little consumption needs and exists to generate
and sell power. Third, there can be utility IPPs that sell power outside their franchise area. [d. at 4244.
ISO. Traditional cost-of-service ratemaking may well become a regulatory relic. Such ratemaking
works well when the industry is expanding and costs are declining. In such a situation, cost-based
ratemaking encourages the regulated entity, such as a public utility, to invest more in capital expansion ..
When, however, costs are rising, too much investment in plant leads to excess capacity and overinvestment in plant. Overinvestment, in tum, leads to regulators trimming rate increase requests which can
lead to underinvestment. See id. at 26-29; see also Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm under
Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. EcON. REV. 1052 (1962) (discusses the tendency to overinvest); J.
TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION ch. 4 (1987) (same); P. NAVARRO, supra note 92 (discusses the tendency to underinvest under the traditional scheme of public utility regulation).
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below the buyer's (incumbent's) incremental cost in order to profit and
stay in the market. Most frequently, buyers of IPP power will be
franchised utilities, often vertically integrated, who will buy when
electricity is cheaper in the market than it is to produce.
FERC natural gas and electricity rulemakings are revolutionary
in two ways. First, they rest on FERC's existing authority and not on
some new legislative mandate. Second, they break away from traditional utility-type regulation. Still, these proposals are consistent with
the dominant model of energy regulation because the model aspires to
mimic the market when it can, and resorts to regulation only when a
market imperfection can be pointed out as a justification for government intervention. The one cautionary note is that the regulatory
transitions, like any such transition, will have associated costs, and
complaints will be heard from the losers. For example, traditional
public utilities, faced with new competition, will face a potential loss of
market power. Captive consumers of natural gas and electricity may
also complain. The realignment of these two industries should improve allocative efficiency as natural gas and electricity are sold at accurate prices without an accompanying loss of social welfare. Yet
captive consumers of natural gas and electricity may bear an unreasonable amount of the transition costs, and a general move to the market will not, on its own, protect those consumers. However, there will
likely be associated regulation, possibly from the states, to shore up
these imperfections.
Federal natural gas and electricity initiatives clearly are motivated by one overriding goal-to move energy regulations closer to the
market. This movement is premised on the recognition that natural
gas and electricity (and oil and coal) are relatively abundant. Also,
old electricity technoiogies seem to have peaked, while new technologies in production and distribution appear available. Combined, adequate supplies and potential technological gains mean greater
efficiencies and more competition. According to the prevailing tenet
of American democratic capitalism, markets are better suited than
governments to order supplies, demands, and prices in a competitive
environment. Therefore, as a matter of allocative efficiency, the regulatory gamble is that price and allocation controls for natural gas and
electricity should. move outside the hearing rooms of FERC and into
the government markets proposed by these rulemakings.
IV. CONCLUSION

The direct message of the dominant model is that United States
energy policy is market driven. The implication of this message is
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equally clear. Given the structural setting of a complex policymaking
process that is woven throughout government and is directly affected
by the tensions created by separation of powers and federalism, no
comprehensive national energy policy of any detail is likely to develop
despite executive, legislative, or administrative desires to do so.
There are ideological and pragmatic reasons behind this conclusion. . The first reason, grounded in the liberal tradition, is that the
country is "generally suspicious" of central planning. Rather than
have an imitation Japanese or European industrial policy, the United
States economy continues to run on private competition. Granted, the
government will attempt to halt large accumulations of corporate
power through antitrust enforcement. Still, though, countervailing
government control of the economy through heavy central planning is
simply not an accepted way of doing business.
A second and corollary reason is that although government is
used as a backstop to prevent large aggregations of corporate power,
government will also promote and support competitive businesses.
The New Deal was not so much an experiment in social policythough it was clearly that-as it was an example of the federal government stimulating the economy by getting business on its feet again.
Third, there is a commitment to the hard energy path of largescale, high-technology, capital intensive energy production. This com'mitment finds its roots in the industrial revolution of the nineteenth
century. This history makes it difficult for policy makers and decision
makers to design and implement alternative energy policies, thus putting the burden of change on proponents 'of alternatives.
Fourth, also echoing the liberal tradition, there is an underlying
faith in the market. The country's efforts to achieve the virtues of the
market-color blindness, individual liberty, eqmility, and technological innovations-may not reach a Utopian plateau, but government
controls are worse approximations. The country's faith in the market
forms the baseline, and government will only intervene if cracks in the
baseline are perceived.
Thus the dominant model of U.S. energy policy is firmly based in
the tenets of democratic capitalism: private ownership and production; competition; no overt central planning; wariness of monopoly;
and government support of each of the other elements. The hope is
that our national economy and our quality of life can flourish if (1)
markets are relatively clear, (2) entry and exits are relatively inexpensive, and (3) corporate power is relatively dispersed. Indeed, the ideology of domestic energy policy rests upon the idea that inter-industry
and intra-industry competition are highly desirable~' Moreover, such
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industrial pluralism ultimately serves the public interest by providing
relatively abundant energy at relatively stable prices. Economic efficiency, economic growth, economies of scale, and a cautious eye on
market power thus define the public interest in energy. So says the
dominant model. What remains to be seen is whether the dominant
model has significant longevity given contemporary concerns about
the continued use of fossil fuels and environmental degradation.
Before the environmental consequences of hard path energy production can be adequately addressed, however, the dominant structure of
domestic energy policymaking and policy must be acknowledged.
Hopefully, this article has provided that acknowledgement.
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